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45 
IF TECHNOLOGY IS THE HARE, IS 
CONGRESS THE TORTOISE? SPLIT 
CIRCUITS IN THE WAKE OF DAHDA 
Abstract: In United States v. Dahda, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held that, under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968 (“Title III”), the lower court properly denied Dahda’s motion to 
suppress evidence gathered by law enforcement using a mobile interception de-
vice—a device that wiretaps cell phones. A key part of the decision focused on 
the definition of mobile interception devices. The Tenth Circuit defined them as 
devices used to intercept communications that are movable. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in contrast, has defined mobile interception devices as devices used to in-
tercept mobile communications. This Comment argues that both definitions are 
overly broad in the modern context and are at odds with the congressional intent 
underlying Title III. 
INTRODUCTION 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
(“Title III”) governs the legality of the interception and disclosure of oral and 
wire communications.1 Title III generally makes the interception and disclo-
sure of wire and oral communications an unlawful activity.2 This legislation, 
enacted in 1968, addresses the problem of balancing the need to protect the 
privacy of individuals’ communications against the necessity of facilitating 
law enforcement investigations.3 Technological advances, however, have be-
gun to upset this balance, resulting in a circuit split over the definition of one 
class of tools used to intercept communications: “mobile intercept devices.”4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2012) 
(covering the entire text of Title III). 
 2 Id. at §§ 2515, 2516. Section 2516 provides for a small number of law enforcement officers 
who may apply for authorization to intercept communications. See id. § 2516. Law enforcement 
may seek authorization to intercept communications during investigations of certain crimes in-
cluding embezzlement, murder, terrorism, bribery of public officials, and a number of other feder-
al crimes. See id. § 2516(1)(a)–(t). 
 3 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. In 
enacting Title III, Congress sought to implement the dual purposes of protecting oral and wire 
communications’ privacy and creating a uniform set of circumstances and conditions under which 
authorizations for interception may be issued. See id. To protect privacy, Congress forbade wire-
tapping and electronic surveillance by any person other than a law enforcement officer. See id. To 
ensure a uniform set of circumstances and conditions for authorization, wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance are only allowed for the investigation or prevention of specified kinds of serious 
crimes and require a showing of probable cause and authorization by a judge. See id. 
 4 Compare United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017) (limiting the defini-
tion of interception devices to those devices that are mobile), with United States v. Ramirez, 112 
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In the 2017 decision United States v. Dahda, the Tenth Circuit declined 
to follow the Seventh Circuit’s definition for the term “mobile interception 
device.”5 The Tenth Circuit held that a series of extraterritorial wiretap au-
thorizations were facially insufficient based on a plain language definition of 
mobile intercept device.6 Ultimately, however, the Tenth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence 
gathered.7 The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas convicted the 
defendant, Los Dahda, of crimes related to an alleged marijuana distribution 
conspiracy.8 The court accordingly sentenced Dahda to imprisonment and a 
fine of nearly seventeen million dollars.9 The defendant appealed the verdict, 
focusing on nine orders issued by the district court authorizing wiretaps on 
the defendant’s and his co-conspirators’ cell phones.10 The orders further pro-
vided that interception could take place in any other jurisdiction within the 
United States, should the targeted cell phone leave the issuing judge’s juris-
diction.11 At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the intercepted communi-
cations, asserting that the wiretap orders violated Title III’s limitation on in-
terceptions outside the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction.12 The district 
court denied the motion and the defendant appealed to the Tenth Circuit on 
the grounds that the facial insufficiency of the authorizations entitled him to 
suppression of the evidence gathered from the related interceptions.13 
This Comment argues that neither the Tenth Circuit’s nor the Seventh 
Circuit’s definition, in the modern context, is consistent with the congression-
                                                                                                                           
F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997) (defining devices for intercepting mobile communications more 
broadly). 
 5 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114. 
 6 Id. The court held that the wiretap orders authorized the use of stationary listening posts to 
intercept cell phone communications, both of which could be beyond the court’s territorial juris-
diction. Id. The Tenth Circuit, however, defined “mobile interception device” as an interception 
device that can be easily moved, thus excluding stationary listening posts from the exception in 
Section 2518. See id. Used in this context, an extraterritorial wiretap authorization refers to an 
order authorizing a wiretap outside of the issuing judge’s territorial jurisdiction. See id. at 1111 
(noting that the wiretap orders under which evidence was gathered exceeded the issuing judge’s 
territorial jurisdiction); see also Extraterritorial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining “extraterritorial” as “occurring beyond the geographic limits of a particular jurisdic-
tion”). A facially insufficient authorization order is an order that does not conform to the require-
ments under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). 
 7 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1116. 
 8 Id. at 1105. According to the trial court findings, Dahda helped the network by driving cash 
from Kansas to California, helping with the purchasing, packaging, and shipping of the marijuana, 
and selling the marijuana in Kansas. Id. The charges levied against Dahda and his co-conspirators 
alleged a conspiracy to distribute in excess of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 1111. 
 11 Id. at 1112. 
 12 Id. at 1111. 
 13 Id. at 1105. 
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al intent underlying Title III because both definitions are overly broad and do 
not accomplish Congress’s goals for the statute.14 Part I of this Comment pre-
sents an overview of Title III and its provisions, and outlines the state of the 
law prior to Dahda.15 Part II examines and discusses the Tenth Circuit’s 
Dahda decision and how the court analyzed Title III and the specific term 
“mobile intercept device,” and ultimately arrived at its definition.16 Part II 
additionally considers the Dahda concurrence.17 Part III argues that neither 
court has accounted for technological changes in formulating its definition for 
“mobile interception device” and that a more narrow definition would better 
serve the congressional intent underlying the statute.18 
I. TITLE III: LEGAL FRAMEWORK PRE-DAHDA 
Title III permits law enforcement officers to apply for, and courts to is-
sue, authorizations to intercept telephone communications using wiretaps or 
other means of interception.19 To obtain a wiretap authorization order under 
Title III, an application must be filed with the court.20 This application must 
contain the applicant’s identifying information and the facts and circum-
stances justifying the wiretap, including the nature and location of the facili-
ties from which, or the place where, the communications are to be inter-
cepted.21 Upon review of the application, a judge may enter an ex parte or-
der authorizing the requested wiretap within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court in which the judge is sitting.22 In most cases, judges may only author-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 114–145 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 19–48 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 49–113 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 109–113 and accompanying text 
 18 See infra notes 114–145 and accompanying text. 
 19 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2518(1) (2012). Section 2516(1) authorizes specific law enforcement 
personnel to file an application seeking authorization for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (or 
other responsible federal agency) to intercept wire or oral communications. See id. § 2516(1). 
Section 2516(1) further authorizes federal judges to approve such applications in conformity with 
Section 2518. See id. Section 2518 details the procedure by which law enforcement must make an 
application and the procedure by which the judge reviews, approves, and issues an order authoriz-
ing the requested interceptions. See id. § 2518. 
 20 Id. § 2518(1) (requiring an application for an order authorizing or approving the intercep-
tion of a wire, oral, or electronic communication to be made in writing to a judge). 
 21 Id. § 2518(1) (detailing what information must be included in the application for a wiretap 
authorization order). Further information that must be contained in the application includes other 
investigative procedures (if any) used and their success or failure, the period of time for which the 
interception is required to be maintained, statement of the facts concerning all previous applica-
tions known to the applicant related to the same persons, facilities, or places specified, and, if 
applicable, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a rea-
sonable explanation of failure to obtain such results. See id. 
 22 Id. § 2518(3). An ex parte order is a judicial order issued in the presence of only one party 
and without opposition from the adverse party. See Ex Parte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
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ize wiretaps where the interception takes place within the judge’s territorial 
jurisdiction.23 
The term “intercept” under Title III is defined as the “aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication 
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device”.24 Title III 
does not define where an interception takes place, leaving open the question 
of whether interception occurs at the site where the telephone is being wire-
tapped or at the site where law enforcement hears the communications.25 In 
the 1992 case United States v. Rodriguez, however, the Second Circuit held 
that interception takes place in both locations—at the site of the phone and 
at the site of hearing.26 Relying on Rodriguez, a court could issue a wiretap 
authorization order allowing law enforcement to listen to communications 
within the judge’s territorial jurisdiction, even though the wiretapped device 
may be outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction.27 
Title III specifically includes an exception allowing for interceptions 
outside of a judge’s territorial jurisdiction, provided that the order limits those 
interceptions to instances involving a “mobile interception device.”28 As with 
the term “intercept,” the statute does not define “mobile interception de-
vice.”29 The seminal case defining “mobile interception device,” until recent-
ly, was the 1997 Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Ramirez.30 In 
Ramirez, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the term described a device that 
intercepts mobile communications, such as a device designed to intercept 
                                                                                                                           
 23 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3); see United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1111 (10th Cir. 2017). 
Judges may issue orders authorizing interception outside of their territorial jurisdiction in the 
event that law enforcement plans to use a mobile interception device. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
The statute is silent on the definition of mobile interception device. See id. As will be discussed in 
the remainder of this comment, at least two United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have written 
opinions containing their respective definitions for mobile interception device, though the defini-
tions are divergent.[See supra note 4?] Compare Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1104 (limiting the definition 
of interception devices to those devices that are mobile), with United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 
849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997) (defining devices for intercepting mobile communications more broadly). 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). 
 25 See United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992). Interception consists of 
two parts: where the device used acquires the content of the message being intercepted (e.g. where 
a traditional wiretap receives a signal through a phone line) and where the law enforcement offi-
cial hears the contents of the message acquired through the device. See id. 
 26 Id. (holding that because the definition of “intercept” under Title III includes actually hear-
ing the message, the interception must also be considered to occur at the place where the contents 
of the message being intercepted are heard). 
 27 See id. at 132, 136 (upholding the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress wiretap 
evidence obtained in New Jersey by agents in New York authorized by a New York magistrate 
judge). 
 28 18 U.S.C § 2518(3). 
 29 Id. § 2510. 
 30 Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
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mobile phone calls.31 Under Ramirez, the statutory exception accordingly 
applied where a judge issued a wiretap authorization order allowing for inter-
ception of communications originating from a mobile phone.32 Moreover, the 
limitation carried no further jurisdictional limitations.33 
The definitions and legal framework above carry particular importance 
when analyzing the availability of suppression as a remedy under Article 
III.34 Suppression is available as a remedy in cases where, (1) a communica-
tion was unlawfully intercepted, (2) a facially insufficient order authorized 
the interception, or (3) an interception occurred that was not in conformance 
with the order authorizing it.35 
With regard to the first category, Article III expressly forbids, except in 
a narrow band of circumstances, the interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id. One modern and controversial device fitting this definition is the class of devices called 
StingRays. See generally Linda Lye, New Docs: DOJ Admits That StingRays Spy on Innocent 
Bystanders, ACLU N. CAL. (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/new-docs-doj-admits-
stingrays-spy-innocent-bystanders [https://perma.cc/X5F3-PV3U]. Public documents obtained by 
the ACLU indicate that some stingray devices may have the functionality to intercept wireless 
communications. See Documents Obtained by ACLU Pursuant to FOIA Request, ACLU N. CAL. 
11, https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20151027-crm_lye.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4PH-TYML] [herein-
after StingRay Documents]. These StingRay devices, if possessing the functionality to intercept 
wireless communications, would not be subject to the territorial restrictions of Section 2518(3) 
under the Seventh Circuit’s definition for mobile interception device. See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 
853; see also StingRay Documents, supra, at 11 (claiming that digital analyzers/cell site simula-
tors/triggerfish and similar devices, like the StingRay, may be able to intercept the contents of 
wireless communications if the function is not disabled). This definition, therefore, could lead to 
the widespread use of a controversial piece of technology by placing it within the statutory excep-
tion. See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
 32 See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (holding that the orders fell within the exception under Title 
III, because a mobile interception device is a device used to intercept mobile communications and 
the wiretap authorization order authorized interception of communications from a mobile phone). 
 33 See id. (“[S]o understood [the definition for mobile interception device] authorized the 
district judge in the Western District of Wisconsin to order a tap on the phone . . . regardless of 
where the phone or listening post was.”). 
 34 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (providing suppression as a remedy). 
 35 Id. § 2518(10)(a); see, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 525, 533 (1974) (af-
firming grant of motion to suppress and holding that communications were unlawfully intercepted 
where the Attorney General’s executive assistant approved the application); United States v. 
Lomeli, 676 F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s grant of motion to suppress 
evidence obtained by wiretap and holding that wiretaps were made unlawfully where applications 
for authorization did not identify the law enforcement officers authorizing the applications); State 
v. Mazzone, 648 A.2d 978, 987–88 (Md. 1994) (vacating Court of Special Appeals’ judgment 
denying motion to suppress and holding that failure to minimize interception is tantamount to 
intercepting beyond the scope of an authorization). Suppression is a remedy by which the court 
stops certain evidence from being  introduced at trial. Suppress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). In cases under Title III, suppression prevents the introduction at trial of content from 
wrongfully intercepted communications. See, e.g., Giordano, 416 U.S. at 509 (noting that suppres-
sion hearings began when the government announced that it would use intercepted communica-
tions). 
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communications.36 Therefore, any person who intercepts a communication 
and is not otherwise authorized by Title III has done so unlawfully, render-
ing the intercepted communication vulnerable to suppression.37 Second, 
Article III sets forth specific requirements for orders authorizing the lawful 
interception of communications.38 Orders issued by courts that do not satis-
fy these requirements are deemed facially invalid.39 Communications inter-
cepted pursuant to a facially invalid order are similarly susceptible to sup-
pression.40 Finally, otherwise lawful interceptions performed after issuance 
of a facially valid order, but intercepted in a manner that is not in conformi-
ty with the wiretap authorization order, could be suppressed.41 
An aggrieved party may assert any of the defects above and move for 
suppression, but bears the burden of proving the defect.42 If the burden is 
met, the analysis then proceeds to a second step in which the court deter-
mines whether or not suppression is appropriate based on the nature of the 
defect.43 If a court decides that the defect interferes with the implementation 
of the congressional intent of Article III, suppression may be the appropriate 
remedy.44 The legislative history of Title III reveals the goals of the statute 
and provides examples of how Title III accomplishes such goals.45 Its two 
                                                                                                                           
 36 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1), 2516. 
 37 Id. §§ 2511(1), 2516, 2518(10); see, e.g., Lomeli, 676 F.3d at 742 (affirming grant of de-
fendant’s motion to suppress and holding that wiretap authorization applications that did not iden-
tify the law enforcement officer who approved the application violated the statutory requirements 
under Section 2518(1)). 
 38 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)–(4) (detailing the procedure by which law enforcement files its 
application and the authorizing judge reviews and approves or denies the application). 
 39 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (holding that a wiretap authorization order that violated Title 
III’s territorial jurisdiction restriction was facially insufficient). 
 40 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii). 
 41 Id. § 2518(10)(a)(iii) 
 42 United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. 
Mitchell, 274 F.3d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 2001)) (holding that wiretap authorizations carry a pre-
sumption of validity and the defendant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption). 
 43 See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527 (requiring suppression only where the defect is related to 
one of “those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement[s] the congressional 
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the em-
ployment of this extraordinary investigative device”). 
 44 See id.; see also Radcliff, 331 F.3d at 1162 (holding that the rule requiring suppression only 
where a defect is related to a requirement directly and substantially implementing the congres-
sional intent underlying the statute, as established in Giordano, applies to facially insufficient 
authorization orders or approvals as well). 
 45 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
Congress passed Title III primarily for the dual purposes of protecting the privacy of wireless 
communications and creating a uniform set of circumstances and conditions under which intercep-
tion of wireless communications may be authorized. Id. Furthermore, Congress sought to ensure 
that the authority to authorize applications for the use of wiretapping was centralized as much as 
possible in a publicly responsible official subject to the political process. Id. at 2185. Centraliza-
tion in politically-accountable public officials ensured that the public would be able to identify the 
official responsible if abuses of the wiretap authority began to occur. Id. With the threat of the 
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primary goals are to protect the privacy of oral and wire communications 
and to establish a consistent set of circumstances under which wiretaps may 
be authorized.46 Title III, however, does not explicitly identify which re-
quirements meaningfully implement these goals.47 Accordingly, it has thus 
far fallen to the courts to differentiate technical defects from defects under-
mining the purpose of the statute.48 
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT BREAKS WITH THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT  
IN UNITED STATES V. DAHDA 
In 2017, in United States v. Dahda, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress in-
tercepted communications presented as evidence against him at trial.49 To 
determine whether the motion was appropriately denied, the court analyzed 
the denial in two steps.50 First, the court decided that the orders authorizing 
the intercepted communications were facially deficient.51 The court ulti-
mately concluded, however, that the facial deficiency was technical in na-
                                                                                                                           
political process hanging over their heads, Congress hoped that law enforcement officials would 
be sufficiently deterred from abusing wiretap authority. See id. 
 46 Id. at 2185. The legislative history also states that Title III was intended to delineate on a 
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral 
communications may be authorized. Id. 
 47 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (covering the entire text of Title III). Section 2518 
in particular contains a large number of requirements for applications for and authorizations of 
wiretap approvals. See Id. at § 2518. None of these requirements, however, are explicitly identi-
fied as more important than the others and a large body of case law has arisen around what consti-
tutes a material defect as opposed to a technical defect. See, e.g., Lomeli, 676 F.3d at 742 (affirm-
ing the district court’s grant of motion to suppress evidence obtained by wiretap and holding that 
wiretaps were made unlawfully where applications for authorization did not identify the law en-
forcement officers authorizing the applications); Radcliff, 331 F.3d at 1162–63 (holding that omis-
sion of the requesting official’s name from the authorization order was a technical defect that did 
not disrupt the purpose of the statute and therefore suppression was not required). 
 48 See Radcliff, 331 F.3d at 1162–63 (holding that omission of the requesting official’s name 
from the authorization order was a technical defect that did not disrupt the purpose of the statute 
and therefore suppression was not required). 
 49 United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1111 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 50 Id. at 1114. This two-part analysis is consistent with the history of cases related to Section 
2518(10). See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974) (holding that suppression 
is only appropriate where an identified defect relates to a requirement that directly and substantial-
ly carries out the congressional intent underlying Title III); United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 
1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the rule limiting suppression as a remedy to defects 
related to requirements that directly and substantially carry out the congressional intent underlying 
Title III applied to suppression for facial insufficiency as well as illegal interceptions). 
 51 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 The orders were facially insufficient because they authorized law 
enforcement to use stationary listening posts located outside the authorizing court’s territorial 
jurisdiction to intercept calls from mobile phones also located outside the authorizing court’s terri-
torial jurisdiction. Id. This holding was written in light of the newly adopted definition for mobile 
interception device as an interception device that is mobile—a categorization that excludes sta-
tionary listening posts. See id. 
52 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
ture and did not undermine the congressional intent behind Title III.52 In so 
concluding, the Tenth Circuit declined to adopt the definition for “mobile 
interception device” adopted previously by the Seventh Circuit.53 Section A 
of this Part discusses the Tenth Circuit declining to adopt the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s definition for “mobile interception device” and why this led to the 
conclusion that the authorization orders were facially deficient.54 Section B 
of this Part discusses the court’s conclusion that, despite the facial deficien-
cy, suppression was not an appropriate remedy.55 Section C of this Part dis-
cusses the Dahda concurrence and its focus on Title III’s age, evolving 
technology, and the need for Congress’ attention to bring it into modernity.56 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis 
Prior to trial, Dahda moved to suppress communications intercepted 
pursuant to nine wiretap authorization orders issued by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Kansas.57 The primary challenge to these orders 
contended that the orders authorized interception outside the bounds of the 
court’s territorial jurisdiction in violation of Title III.58 The analysis to de-
termine whether the orders were facially insufficient involved a two-step 
inquiry: whether the orders permitted interception outside the court’s terri-
torial jurisdiction and, if so, whether the orders limited such interception to 
instances involving a mobile interception device.59 
The court disposed of the first question—whether the orders exceeded 
the district court’s territorial jurisdiction—by relying on the definition pro-
vided by Title III for intercept, paired with an earlier decision discussing 
how to determine where interception has taken place.60 The Tenth Circuit, 
in the 1994 case United States v. Tavarez, interpreted the Oklahoma coun-
terpart to Title III and held that interception occurs both where the tapped 
telephone is located and where the intercepted communications are first 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. at 1116. The court reviewed the legislative history, noting several examples of how 
Congress carried out its intent in the construction of the statute, though none of the examples indi-
cated that the territorial limitation was significant to the congressional intent. Id. at 1114–15. 
 53 Id. at 1114. The Seventh Circuit defined mobile interception device as a device used to 
intercept mobile communications. United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 54 See infra notes 57–92 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 93–108 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. 
 57 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1111. 
 58 Id.; see 18 U.S.C § 2518(3) (allowing a judge to enter an ex parte order authorizing or ap-
proving interception of communications within the territorial jurisdiction in which the judge sits, 
or outside that jurisdiction in the case of a mobile interception device). 
 59 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114. 
 60 Id. at 1112 (citing United States v. Tavarez, 40 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 1994)). The 
definition for intercept under Title III includes acquiring the contents of a phone call using a de-
vice. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
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heard by law enforcement.61 In Dahda, the court concluded that the lan-
guage of the orders lacked geographic restrictions on both the locations of 
the cell phones and the locations of the listening posts to be used.62 The or-
ders therefore violated the statutory limitation on territoriality.63 
The inquiry, however, moved on to the issue of whether these orders 
triggered the “mobile interception device” exception.64 This question neces-
sarily depended on the definition of “mobile interception device,” which is 
not defined by Title III.65 The court offered three possibilities for the neces-
sary definition: (1) a listening device that is mobile; (2) a cell phone that is 
being intercepted; or (3) a device that intercepts mobile communications, 
such as cell phone calls.66 The analysis began with the plain meaning of the 
statutory language, with an eye toward whether the plain meaning would 
conflict with the legislative history.67 
The court began by considering the language of Title III itself and re-
lied on grammatical structure to determine the plain meaning.68 The court 
noted that the word “mobile” was an adjective, modifying the noun “inter-
ception device,” and thus concluded that the plain meaning of the phrase 
referred to the mobility of the device used to facilitate the interception.69 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Tavarez, 40 F.3d at 1138; see Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1112. The Tenth Circuit in Dahda goes 
on to demonstrate the parallels between the Oklahoma statute and Title III, such as the definitions 
for “intercept” and “aural communication.” Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1112. The holding that intercep-
tion takes place both at the place that the tapped telephone is located and at the place that law 
enforcement hears the communication is widely accepted and has been adopted by every circuit to 
hear the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 551–52 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding 
that the definition of interception includes the location of the listening post and concluding that 
because the listening post at issue was within Pennsylvania that the interception was lawful); 
United States v. Henley, 766 F.3d 893, 911, 912 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the definition of 
“intercept,” in referencing “aural” acquisition, necessarily encompasses the place where the redi-
rected contents of the communication are first heard); United States v. Luong, 471 F.33d 1107, 
1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the most logical interpretation of the definition of interception 
is that it occurs both where the phone is located and where law enforcement overhears the call); 
United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that an interception oc-
curs in the jurisdiction where the tapped phone is located, where the second phone in the conver-
sation is located, and where the scanner used to overhear the call is located). 
 62 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1112. 
 63 Id. The exact wording of the orders authorized interception to take place in any other juris-
diction within the United States if the cell phones to be tapped were transported outside the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the court. See id. 
 64 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
 65 See 18 U.S.C § 2510 (defining terms of art for Title III but not defining “mobile intercep-
tion device”). 
 66 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1112–13. 
 67 Id. at 1113 (quoting Starzynski v. Sequoia Forest Indus., 72 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 1995)) 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; see also United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2013) (DeMoss, J., concur-
ring) (noting that, on its face, “mobile interception device” appears to refer to whether or not the 
device used to intercept communications is mobile, not whether the taped phone is mobile). 
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Proceeding to the second possible interpretation—a cell phone that was be-
ing intercepted—the court dismissed it as contrary to the intent of Title III.70 
Because the statute defined a device as something used to intercept a call, 
the court held that it would be contradictory to define “mobile interception 
device” as the cell phone being intercepted.71 
Finally, the court addressed the third possible interpretation—a device 
used to intercept mobile communications—which was also the interpreta-
tion that the Seventh Circuit adopted in United States v. Ramirez in 1997.72 
The Tenth Circuit turned, as with the first interpretation, to the grammatical 
construction of the phrase, concluding that the third interpretation would 
require the court to rewrite the statute.73 
The Seventh Circuit in Ramirez declined to adopt the plain meaning of 
the phrase “mobile interception device,” concluding that it seemed inappli-
cable in context.74 Under the literal meaning of the phrase, obtaining facial-
ly sufficient orders to tap cell phones becomes a function of chance rather 
than prudent investigation.75 Because cell phones are meant to be mobile, 
the Seventh Circuit reasons that they are likely, at some point, to be carried 
out of the territorial jurisdiction of the district in which the crime is being 
investigated.76 Therefore, if law enforcement officers wished to use a sta-
tionary listening post outside of the district to maximize the chances of in-
terception, they would be required to obtain subsequent orders authorizing 
wiretaps in other districts.77 The Seventh Circuit concluded that a literal 
reading of the phrase “mobile interception device” imposed illogical limita-
tions on law enforcement’s ability to practically investigate crimes using 
wiretaps.78 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id.; Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
 73 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113. The court again referred to the term “mobile” as an adjective and 
“interception” and “device” as nouns. Id. The court concluded, considering the words’ roles in the 
phrase, that “mobile” must modify “interception,” “device,” or both. Id. The third interpretation, 
however, uses “mobile” to modify “telephone,” which is not present in the phrase in question. Id. 
 74 Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 852. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. (noting that the literal interpretation would mean that “if . . . the listening post is 
stationary and is for practical reasons to be located outside the district in which the crime is being 
investigated and the cellular phone is believed to be located, the government . . . must obtain the 
wiretap order from the district in which the listening post is located, even though that location is 
entirely fortuitous from the standpoint of the criminal investigation”). 
 78 Id. The Seventh Circuit observed that the literal statutory language would: (1) forbid a 
judge in State 1 from authorizing use of a stationary listening post located in State 2 to intercept 
calls from a phone located in State 2; (2) allow a judge in State 1 to authorize use of a stationary 
listening post in State 2 to intercept calls from a phone in State 1; (3) allow a judge in State 1 to 
authorize use of a stationary listening post in State 1 to intercept calls from a phone anywhere. See 
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The Seventh Circuit concluded further that the legislative history of Ti-
tle III indicated that the term “mobile interception device” should have a 
broader meaning than the limited literal definition.79 The legislative history 
indicates that the provision allowing for “mobile interception devices” ap-
plies equally to a physical bug planted on a car and to taps on phones in the 
car.80 Because there is no specific reference or limitation to vehicles within 
Title III, the court concluded that the examples in the legislative history 
were offered as inclusive illustrations of mobile interception devices rather 
than exclusive definitions.81 The court reasoned that a device planted in a 
car is not a “mobile interception device” because the device itself is station-
ary.82 Likewise a tap on a phone is not placed on the phone, rather on a tele-
phone line through which the phone’s communications are transmitted.83 
Therefore, the court held that the emphasis in “mobile interception device” 
is on the mobility of the communications rather than on the devices used to 
intercept them.84 Thus the Seventh Circuit defined “mobile interception de-
vice,” in the context of legislative history, as a device used to intercept mo-
bile communications.85 The Seventh Circuit further held that the literal in-
terpretation would not serve the legislative intent to protect the privacy of 
communications because it does nothing to prevent law enforcement from 
                                                                                                                           
id. In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, this system relied too heavily on chance to be consistent with 
the congressional goal of establishing a uniform system for the authorization of wiretap orders. 
See id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 30 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3584). Congress recognized the possibility that in either of these cases the vehicle is likely to 
move, at some point, out of the authorizing judge’s territorial jurisdiction. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 
30. Such a change in location would not be problematic, provided the device was installed in the 
authorizing judge’s territorial jurisdiction. Id. Where the vehicle is moved prior to installation, 
installation may not occur until the vehicle is returned to the issuing judge’s territorial jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 81 Ramirez¸ 112 F.3d at 852. 
 82 Id. at 852–53. 
 83 Id. at 853. In Ramirez, a judge in the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
authorized law enforcement to intercept mobile phone calls made from a cell phone in the posses-
sion of a co-conspirator who traveled back and forth from Wisconsin to Minnesota. 112 F.3d at 
851. The listening post was then set up in Minnesota for practical reasons: law enforcement was 
fearful that they would be recognized in the defendant’s hometown. Id. After tapping the phone, 
law enforcement discovered that the user of the phone they had tapped was not who they believed 
it would be previously, and that the actual user of the phone never left Minnesota. Id. Thus, no 
part of the interceptions took place in the issuing judge’s territorial jurisdiction triggering the need 
to examine the exception under Title III. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
 84 Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
 85 Id. With this definition established, the Seventh Circuit went on to conclude that the order 
issued by the district court in Wisconsin was within the exception under Title III because they 
authorized interception of mobile communications, even though both the listening post and the 
phones used for the communications were located outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Id. 
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seeking the necessary orders in other courts.86 Rather, the literal definition 
would only serve to complicate law enforcement efforts.87 
The Tenth Circuit in Dahda, however, held the opposite view.88 In ad-
dressing the legislative history, the court concluded that the illustrations 
provided lent further support to the plain language of the statute.89 Both ex-
amples depicted in the legislative history are interception devices that are 
mobile, bringing them in line with the plain language of the phrase.90 In keep-
ing with the interpretive canon adopted, the court held that, because the plain 
meaning is not demonstrably at odds with the legislative history, they were 
unable to interpret the statute differently.91 Therefore, because the orders in 
question authorized interception of cell phones using a stationary listening 
post, all of which were located outside of the court’s jurisdiction, the orders 
were facially insufficient under Title III.92 
B. Suppression as a Remedy After Defining “Mobile Interception Device” 
Facial invalidity in itself does not justify suppression as a remedy.93 
Rather, suppression requires that the deficient element directly and substan-
tially carries out the congressional intent behind the statute.94 By analyzing 
the legislative history behind Title III, the court sought to determine wheth-
er the territorial limitation substantially implemented Congress’s intent.95 
The Tenth Circuit extracted two primary goals from the legislative history: 
protecting the privacy of communications and creating a uniform set of cir-
cumstances and conditions under which interception may be authorized.96 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. As discussed above, the literal meaning of the term is an interception device that is, 
itself, easily movable. See id. at 852. Had the district court adhered to the literal definition, law 
enforcement could have sought the same order in Minnesota and likely obtained it, though this 
would necessitate another application process. See id. at 853. 
 87 Id. at 853. 
 88 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. 
Foy, 641 F.3d 455, 463 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
 94 Id. (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)); see United States v. 
Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003) (extending the second step in the analysis to apply 
to suppression sought under Section 2518(10(a)(ii)). 
 95 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114–15. Prior to the decision in Dahda two courts had analyzed the 
same issue, coming out on opposite sides. Compare Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1500 
(11th Cir. 1986) (holding that violating the territorial restriction under Title III does not implicate 
Congress’s core concerns underlying the statute), with United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 515 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the territorial restriction is a core concern of Title III). 
 96 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114–15 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153 (1968), as reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153). 
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The court found in the legislative history two examples of how Title III 
protects the privacy of communications.97 First, Congress limited lawful in-
terception to certain law enforcement officers’ investigation of a particular set 
of crimes, to ensure that wiretaps would be used only in circumstances war-
ranting them.98 Second, Congress created a “probable cause” evidentiary bur-
den that must be overcome before a wiretap may be authorized.99 
The territorial limitation was not identified as one of the limitations di-
rectly protecting privacy.100 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that the terri-
torial limitation under Title III did not substantially implement Congress’s 
goal to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications.101 
The court continued its analysis by addressing the second legislative 
goal of establishing uniformity in authorizations for wiretaps.102 Congress 
sought to centralize wiretap decisions with the chief prosecuting officers in 
the state in which the wiretap is sought.103 The goal of this centralization 
was to place responsibility for wiretaps in the hands of publically and polit-
ically accountable officials who would bear the consequences of any abuse 
of the method.104 The court concluded that not only did the territorial limita-
tion fail to substantially implement this goal, it also may have detracted 
from it by requiring cooperation of multiple prosecutors in multiple juris-
dictions during the course of an investigation.105 If multiple prosecutors be-
came involved, the clear lines of responsibility Congress envisioned would 
become muddled.106 Indirect lines of responsibility would make it more dif-
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. 
 98 See generally S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153 (detailing the legislative intent behind Title III, 
its purposes, and its development). 
 99 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153). In placing this eviden-
tiary burden on those seeking wiretap authorizations, Congress sought to deter law enforcement 
from filing frivolous applications that would needlessly interfere with the privacy of wireless 
communications. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153. Furthermore, a uniform evidentiary burden 
furthers the congressional goal of ensuring that wiretap authorization applications are made for a 
consistent set of circumstances under which the surveillance measure is justified. See id. 
 100 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115. 
 101 Id. at 1115, 1116; see United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974) (holding that the 
absence of legislative history concerning certain Title III provisions contributed to a finding that a 
statutory violation did not warrant suppression). 
 102 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115. 
 103 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2187). 
 104 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2185. Centralization of the decisions in approving applications for 
wiretap authorizations also avoids the possibility of divergent practices among law enforcement 
officials. Id. Because another goal for this legislation is delineating a uniform basis for the appli-
cation for and approval of wiretap authorizations divergent practices would significantly under-
mine this core aspect of Title III. Id. at 2153, 2185. 
 105 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115 (citing Adams, 788 F.2d at 1499). 
 106 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2185 (noting that the statute was designed to provide clear 
lines of responsibility to identifiable law enforcement officers). 
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ficult to hold officials accountable for abuses of the wiretap authority.107 
Therefore, because the legislative history did not identify the territorial 
limitation as central to the implementation of Congress’s intent, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that suppression was not required.108 
C. Judge Lucero’s Concurrence 
Judge Lucero’s concurrence is primarily a cautionary note and a call to 
action, warning that technology has significantly surpassed the wording of 
Title III.109 Exploring the legislative history used throughout the majority 
opinion, Judge Lucero criticized the statute as “trapped in history” and in-
tended only to cover situations in which a phone being monitored leaves the 
original jurisdiction.110 It appeared to Judge Lucero that Congress envi-
sioned that law enforcement would need to affix a physical device on mo-
bile phones to monitor their calls.111 As Judge Lucero notes, however, 
evolving technology has enabled law enforcement to monitor phone calls 
without such physical device, thus rendering Congress’s presumption from 
the 1960’s inaccurate.112 In light of this evolved technology, Judge Lucero 
called Congress to action in updating the language of the statute to more 
closely reflect current technology.113 
III. KEEPING UP WITH THE TECHNOLOGY: BOTH CIRCUITS FAIL TO 
ADDRESS THE MODERN CONTEXT 
The differing definitions for “mobile interception device” highlight the 
tension between the statute’s purpose, language, evolving technology, and 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. Congress likely placed such high value on accountability for law enforcement officials 
due to their vulnerability to the political process, as opposed to appointed judges who are general-
ly insulated from the same forces. Id. 
 108 Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1116. The defendant argued that the territorial limitation was im-
portant in thwarting forum shopping by law enforcement and reduced opportunities to choose 
forums where an application is more likely to be approved. Id. at 1115. The court was not per-
suaded. Id. The court reasoned that law enforcement seeking approval in a specific court would 
only need to use a mobile interception device—defined a few paragraphs earlier in the decision as 
a mobile device to intercept communications—or using a listening post in the preferred forum’s 
territorial jurisdiction. Id. Therefore, the territorial limitation does not meaningfully curb the dan-
ger of forum shopping. Id. 
 109 Id, at 1118 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 110 Id.at 1118–19. 
 111 Id. at 1119. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. (agreeing with the majority that the statutory text need not be tortured to apply to 
all calls placed from a mobile phone, but indicating that it is for Congress to update Title III to 
account for modern devices if it so chooses). 
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judicial response to such evolutions in technology.114 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit’s 2017 decision in Dahda creates a circuit split 
between the Tenth and Seventh Circuits, creating the possibility that the 
U.S. Supreme Court steps in to resolve it.115 Yet neither circuit has directly 
addressed what is, perhaps, the central issue: the fact that technology has 
infinitely outpaced the evolution of wiretap regulation and has left the 
“quaint language” of the statute in its dust.116 With the prevalence of mobile 
phones in modern times, it is abundantly clear that Title III is in need of an 
overhaul.117 This Part considers the reasoning in both Ramirez and Dahda 
and concludes that the reasoning falls short of considering the broader tech-
nological context within which these cases and their accompanying criminal 
investigations occurred.118 
The Seventh Circuit adopts a definition that would potentially make 
every call made over a cell phone vulnerable to a wiretap if either caller is 
involved in a criminal investigation under Title III.119 Thus, under the Sev-
enth Circuit’s definition, the territorial restriction’s applicability turns solely 
on whether the intercepted communications are placed from a mobile 
phone.120 In a modern context, this holding may prove to be overbroad and 
may open a significant number of phone calls placed to potential intercep-
tion without territorial restriction on judges issuing authorizations to do 
so.121 Although this definition may fit within the legislative history underly-
                                                                                                                           
 114 Compare United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017) (limiting the defi-
nition of interception devices to those devices that are mobile), with United States v. Ramirez, 112 
F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997) (defining devices for intercepting mobile communications more 
broadly). 
 115 See Wright v. North Carolina, 415 U.S. 936, 937 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Court is the only source for resolution of a split amongst the circuit courts and that it is the 
Court’s obligation to create uniformity in the circuits). Compare Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (defin-
ing “mobile interception device” as a device used for interception that is mobile), with Ramirez, 
112 F.3d at 853 (defining “mobile interception device” as a device used to intercept mobile com-
munications). 
 116 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1119 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 117 See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/
fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/XSB6-PDUB] (presenting data on cell phone ownership and 
claiming ninety-five percent of Americans owned a smartphone as of the publishing date on Janu-
ary 12, 2017). According to the Mobile Fact Sheet, the figure of ninety-five percent cell phone 
ownership represents an increase from sixty-two percent as of October 2002. See id. 
 118 See infra notes 114–145 and accompanying text. 
 119 See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (holding a “mobile interception device” is a device used to 
intercept mobile communications). 
 120 See id. (holding the emphasis in the phrase falls on the mobility of what is intercepted 
rather than on the mobility of the chosen device). 
 121 See id. (holding that wiretap authorization orders authorizing interception of mobile com-
munications originating from outside the court’s jurisdiction at a stationary listening post outside 
the court’s jurisdiction were not facially deficient). See generally Cell Phones and American 
Adults, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/09/02/cell-phones-
and-american-adults/ [https://perma.cc/VWR5-DYTM] (finding that ninety-five percent of adults 
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ing Title III, it is unlikely that Congress, in 1968, could have conceived of 
the prevalence of mobile communications five years before the modern 
cellphone was patented.122  
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Dahda was given the opportunity to 
revisit the definition for “mobile interception device” with full knowledge 
of the technological advancements since Title III’s passage and the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Ramirez.123 The court’s decision shifted the question to 
the definition of “mobile” rather than closing the door entirely.124 The court 
identified a bug attached to a car phone as an interception device that is 
mobile, but does not indicate how far that example stretches.125The only 
attempt to define the term in the opinion comes from distinguishing be-
tween mobile interception devices and stationary listening posts.126 The 
Tenth Circuit fell victim to the same pitfall as the Seventh Circuit in 
Ramirez—it is unlikely that Congress, more than forty years prior, could 
have accounted for the evolution of wiretap and other interception technol-
ogy.127 In relying on a device’s mobility, the Tenth Circuit comes closer to 
addressing the crux of the matter, but ultimately falls short.128 
The analysis would be better focused on the impact that these defini-
tions would have on the number of wiretap authorization applications that 
                                                                                                                           
surveyed that owned cell phones made at least one voice call per day); NAT’L 911 PROGRAM, 
2015 NATIONAL 911 PROGRESS REPORT (2016) (showing the prevalence of cell phone calls over 
wireline calls in terms of number of 911 calls placed). The National 911 Program reported that the 
percentage of 911 calls originating from cell phones increased by six percentage points from 2013 
data. 2015 NATIONAL 911 PROGRESS REPORT, supra, at 2. This increase was accompanied by a 
corresponding decrease in wireline 911 calls, which fell four percentage points from 2013. Id. 
 122 See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 852–53 (analyzing the legislative history and holding that the 
examples offered were illustrative rather than definitional and that the phrase was intended to be 
interpreted broadly rather than literally). See generally James Janega, The Cell Phone (1973), CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/series/chicago-innovations/chi-cell-
phone-1973-innovations-bsi-series-story.html [https://perma.cc/SUA3-KFJE] (exploring the histo-
ry of the invention and patenting of the modern cell phone in 1973 by Martin Cooper). 
 123 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (addressing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramirez and 
holding that the legislative history does not permit a departure from the plain meaning of the 
phrase). 
 124 See id. (holding that a “mobile interception device” is an interception device that is mobile 
but not defining mobility). 
 125 See id. (holding that the legislative history underscores the statute’s plain language). 
 126 See id. (concluding that because the authorization orders authorized intercepting mobile 
calls from cell phones outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction to be heard at stationary listening 
posts outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction, the orders were facially insufficient). 
 127 See id. at 1119 (Lucero, J., concurring) (concluding that Congress presumed a physical 
device would need to be attached to monitored phones and indicating that evolving technology has 
rendered this presumption invalid). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2012) (encompassing 
the entirety of Title III enacted in 1968, nearly 49 years before the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in 
Dahda). 
 128 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1119 (Lucero, J., concurring) (identifying that the statute is in 
need of congressional attention and writing separately to address the issue). 
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would be filed and the number of communications that would be exposed to 
potential interception.129 Both the Seventh Circuit and the Tenth Circuit def-
initions for mobile interception device create broad classes of modern de-
vices that could be used without concern for territorial limitations on the 
authorizing court by invoking the mobile interception device exception un-
der Title III.130 By creating broad classes of devices that can circumvent the 
statutory territorial limitations, both courts have detracted from the primary 
congressional goals underlying Title III.131 
First, creating broad classes of devices that are not subject to territorial 
limitations does not protect the privacy of communications.132 Such broad 
definitions subject a significantly greater number of communications to 
possible interception.133 Privacy is reduced rather than protected if more 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Lye, supra note 31 (discussing the controversial StingRay device and its potential use 
in intercepting mobile communications); Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 117, at 1 (showing the 
increase over time of cell phone ownership and usage in the United States). 
 130 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (limiting a judge’s ability to authorize interception outside the 
court’s territorial jurisdiction to cases involving the use of a mobile interception device); Dahda, 
853 F.3d at 1114 (defining mobile interception device as an interception device that is mobile); 
Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (defining mobile interception device as a device used to intercept mobile 
communications). The Tenth Circuit’s definition appears only to distinguish between the use of a 
stationary listening post and any other interception device. See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114. The 
Seventh Circuit’s definition is even broader, distinguishing only between devices used to intercept 
wireless and wired communications, a distinction that is becoming more meaningless as cellular 
phones become more prominent. See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. See generally 2015 NATIONAL 
911 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 121, at 2 (detailing the increase in cellular phone calls and the 
corresponding decrease in wired telephone calls). 
 131 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (limiting the definition of interception devices to those de-
vices that are mobile); Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (defining devices for intercepting mobile com-
munications more broadly); S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154. Congress recognized in 1968 that technological advances had already 
made the prevalent use of wiretapping possible. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154. Congress also rec-
ognized that these technological developments threatened the privacy of communications. Id. This 
threat and the litigation that had been emerging indicated that the use of interception devices 
needed limitation. Id. 
 132 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154. (expressing concerns about rapidly advancing technolo-
gy and the possibility that a significant number of communications are already vulnerable to inter-
ception). 
 133 See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. The Seventh Circuit distinguishes mobile communications 
from non-mobile communications in deciding that a mobile interception device is a device for 
intercepting mobile communications, but does not define mobile communications explicitly. See 
id. The court does indicate that, under either the narrow literal definition or the broad definition, 
the government could always seek authorization to intercept cellular phone calls from a stationary 
listening post within the authorizing court’s jurisdiction. See id. At the time of the decision in 
1997, it could not have been predicted that cellular phone calls would eclipse wired phone calls. 
See 2015 NATIONAL 911 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 121, at 2. Nor could the Seventh Circuit 
have foreseen the significant advances in interception technology. See, e.g., Lye, supra note 31. In 
2016, eighty-four percent of interceptions took place via telephone wiretap, the majority of which 
were placed on cellular phones. Wiretap Report 2016, ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, http://www.
uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2016 [https://perma.cc/N8BJ-H3EF]. 
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communications are vulnerable to interception.134 Therefore, the broad def-
initions set by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits are at odds with this goal of 
Title III.135 
Second, such broad definitions grant law enforcement agencies a high 
degree of flexibility in how they file applications for wiretap authoriza-
tions.136 Providing for greater flexibility in filing applications for wiretap 
authorizations conflicts with the second congressional goal for Title III: cre-
ating a uniform set of circumstances and conditions for the authorization of 
interception of communications.137 A diverse population of mobile intercep-
tion devices grants law enforcement a variety of options, should the appli-
cant wish to circumvent the territorial limitations under Title III.138 Both 
definitions for mobile interception device create broad, flexible standards 
for obtaining a wiretap authorization order.139 Broad and flexible standards 
do not further Congress’s second goal underlying Title III: uniformity.140 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154 (expressing concern over the vulnerability of communi-
cations and recognizing the need to restrict how and when communications are intercepted). 
 135 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114; Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853; S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153. 
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits both address congressional intent, but arrive at competing conclu-
sions. Compare Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (holding that the narrower, literal interpretation is not at 
odds with the goals underlying Title III), with Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (holding that the narrow-
er, literal interpretation is at odds with the goals underlying Title III thus allowing the court to 
interpret the phrase more broadly). Neither court addresses the implications of each definition and 
the potential expansion of the use of mobile interception devices that could follow, thus detracting 
from privacy protections intended by Congress. See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114; Ramirez, 112 F.3d 
at 853. 
 136 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115. The Tenth Circuit addressed the concern of forum shopping 
and indicated that law enforcement may already forum shop by simply employing an authorized 
mobile interception device. Id. This concern was largely dismissed, however, because the Tenth 
Circuit held that the territorial limitation did not directly and substantially implement either of 
Congress’ goals in enacting Title III. Id. 
 137 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154 (emphasizing the need to limit the use of wiretapping 
and other forms of interception to a limited set of circumstances and conditions). 
 138 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3); Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115 (concluding that a judge can authorize 
interception of communications anywhere by permitting law enforcement to use a mobile inter-
ception device); Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (concluding that the Western District Court of Wiscon-
sin could authorize the tap of the defendant’s cell phone, regardless of where the phone was locat-
ed, from any listening post, regardless of its location). 
 139 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (defining mobile interception device as an interception de-
vice that is mobile); Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (defining mobile interception device as a device 
used to intercept mobile communications). 
 140 See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (defining mobile interception device as an interception de-
vice that is mobile); Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (defining mobile interception device as a device 
used to intercept mobile communications); S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153 (indicating the im-
portance of limiting wiretapping activity only to duly authorized law enforcement agents in a 
narrow set of circumstances). 
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A narrower definition for mobile interception device would more effec-
tively implement Congress’s goals for Title III.141 Interpreting the phrase nar-
rowly would restrict the number of devices that could be used to circumvent 
the territorial limitation and would thus restrict law enforcement’s ability to 
rely on such workarounds.142 If law enforcement is allowed fewer ways to 
work around the territorial restrictions within Title III, fewer communications 
are likely to be vulnerable to interception—meaning that privacy is better 
protected.143 Furthermore, careful consideration and a well-defined, narrow 
category of devices falling within the extraterritorial exception under Title III 
would ensure that law enforcement looks to the exception only when neces-
sary, creating more uniformity in the way applications are filed.144 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nor the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit fully addressed the underlying cause of 
their circuit split. Both courts attempted to squeeze the square peg of modern 
technology into the round legislative hole Congress created in 1968. Alt-
hough the Tenth Circuit’s definition likely provided greater protection to the 
privacy of phone calls, it did not close the loop entirely; it left open the ques-
tion of the definition of “mobile” while dispensing of the definition of “inter-
ception device.” Updating a nearly half-century-old piece of technological 
legislation may be no small task; however, it is a task of paramount im-
portance to ensure the protection of the privacy of mobile communications. 
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 141 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153. Congress expressed substantial concerns related to the 
widespread use and potential abuse of wiretap technology and the lack of legislation around it 
prior to Title III’s passage in 1968. See id. Title III therefore sought primarily to limit the use of 
wiretapping rather than expand it. See id. 
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